Volunteers in the Smart City: Comparison of Contribution Strategies on
  Human-Centered Measures by Bennati, Stefano et al.
Volunteers in the Smart City: Comparison of
Contribution Strategies on Human-Centered
Measures
Stefano Bennati, Ivana Dusparic, Rhythima Shinde, Catholijn M. Jonker
Keywords: Participatory Sensing , Smart Cities , Public Good , Privacy ,
Fairness
This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication. Copyright may
be transferred without notice, after which this version may no longer be accessible.
Abstract
Several smart city services rely on users contribution, e.g., data, which
can be costly for the users in terms of privacy. High costs lead to reduced
user participation, which undermine the success of smart city technologies.
This work develops a scenario-independent design principle, based on
public good theory, for resource management in smart city applications,
where provision of a service depends on contributors and free-riders, which
benefit from the service without contributing own resources.
Following this design principle, different classes of algorithms for re-
source management are evaluated with respect to human-centered mea-
sures, i.e., privacy, fairness and social welfare. Trade-offs that character-
ize algorithms are discussed across two smart city application scenarios.
These results might help Smart City application designers to choose a
suitable algorithm given a scenario-specific set of requirements, and users
to choose a service based on an algorithm that matches their preferences.
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a substantial increase in active user participation in the smart
city, and with it an increase in the resources contributed by the citizens. Sensor
data is one type of user-contributed resource that is at the base of many smart city
applications [1]. Collecting data in a smart city allows to predict the needs of the
citizens [2], thus enabling the creation of more advanced and more efficient services
with a high potential for innovation [3].
User participation is crucial for the success of several smart city applications, but
it entails costs that disincentivize users. For example, transmitting privacy-sensitive
data in a participatory sensing scenario increases the risk of disclosure and misuse of
private information, e.g., discrimination. Similarly, increasing energy availability in
the smart grid scenario, e.g., by postponing the use of appliances, comes with a risk of
unfair treatment and disproportinatelly low access to the resource [4]. In order for the
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smart city applications to be successful, these costs have to be reduced. Examples of
existing solutions for reducing contribution costs are privacy-enhancing technologies
[5] that reduce the risks associated with disclosing information [6], and fair resource-
management technologies [7], which improve the perceived fairness of the system.
Comparing different implementations of these mechanisms is difficult because they
are tied to specific assumptions about the scenario and the resource. To enable a
comparison of different scenarios, resources and contribution strategies, this paper
introduces a design principle for developing smart city algorithms, which allows the
evaluation of privacy-enhancing technologies in a scenario-independent approach. Sev-
eral smart city services are produced from user-contributed data. Proposed approach
is based on the theory of public goods and voluntary contribution games [8], as it is
an approach well suited for modeling scenarios where a common resource, i.e. the
smart-city service, depends on the action of a population [9]. The orchestration of de-
mand and offer of some resource is driven by contribution strategies, algorithms that
determine which users should contribute to the system at each point in time, based on
the state of the system and a set of system requirements. By acting on the decision
of whether to participate, a contribution strategy is independent of the characteristics
of the resource, hence it can be combined with existing mechanism that work at the
content level, e.g., privacy-preserving algorithms. Additionally, it makes data shar-
ing across smart city applications easier, thanks to the uniform way of dealing with
different kinds of data.
Following this design principle, a simulation framework is developed [10] that allows
a comparison of multiple algorithms for resource contribution, to address the research
question: how do different contribution strategies compare in terms of privacy, fairness
and social welfare?
The first contribution of this paper is to introduce the design principle and verify its
applicability to two different application scenarios, i.e., traffic congestion information
and charging of electric vehicles, by means of real-world datasets. Similar validation
in different scenarios can provide useful insights for the design of other resource-based
smart city applications.
The second contribution is to showcase the generality of the framework by imple-
menting two classes of algorithms – centralized optimization and localized reinforce-
ment learning in two flavors, with and without contextual awareness – in these two
smart city scenarios and evaluating them in terms of trade-offs between system effi-
ciency, user privacy or resource distribution fairness, as opposed to optimizing them
towards a single measure.
The results presented show that the same trade-offs between algorithms repeat
across the application scenarios. Specifically, a localized solution, which works only on
local data, is found to deliver higher privacy and equality than a centralized solution.
Centralized optimization offers instead higher efficiency thanks to the global knowledge
of data. Localized algorithms with and without contextual knowledge are evaluated,
and those considering the context in the decision-making are found to deliver higher
fairness.
This work can be of interest to designers of smart city applications and services that
look for a guideline for the choice of algorithm, given specific scenario priorities in terms
of different measures. Another target audience is that of citizens that are concerned
with the risk of abuse of their data, and particularly privacy-aware prosumers. The
results help quantify different service implementations along measures such as privacy
and fairness, thus help the citizens choose a service provider that best matches their
preferences, reducing the concerns about the system and fostering user participation.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the design
principle and how it can be applied to two smart city scenarios, Section 3 describes
and discusses the main results obtained from simulating voluntary contributions in
different scenarios, and Section 4 concludes the paper discussing possible avenues for
future work and giving general recommendations about the choice of contribution
strategies.
2 Model
This section introduces the design principle, based on the theory of public goods and
Voluntary Contribution Games [8], and it describes how it can be applied to the smart
city scenarios of participatory sensing, with the example of traffic congestion [11], and
smart grids, with the example of electric vehicle charging [12]. Voluntary contribution
games involve the need by a number of users to coordinate the provision of some
public good, e.g., financing a playground with private donations. Table 1 illustrates
the notation of the model, symbols are listed in order of appearance.
Math symbol Description
S The service provider
V = {1, . . . , n} The set of n users
T ∈ N>0 The number of rounds in the simulation
rti The resource produced by user i at time t
vti ∈ R The value associated to disclosing rti
cti ∈ R The cost associated to transmitting rti
pti ∈ R The privacy leaked when disclosing rtiA = {D,C} The action set
ati ∈ A The action of user i at time t
At+ ⊆ V The set of contributors at time t
qt ∈ R The service quality at time t
f : V → R The quality function
τ t ∈ R The quality requirement for time t
S : R× R→R The success function
Gt ∈ R The payoff for a successful round at time t
G : R× R→ R The payoff function for successful rounds
Bt ∈ R The payoff for an unsuccessful round at time t
B : R× R→ R The payoff function for unsuccessful rounds
Uti The utility of user i at time t
Q The total quality of service after T rounds
Scenario: smart grid
piti ∈ R The energy production of household i at time t
βti ∈ R The baseline consumption of household i at time t
σt ∈ R The energy surplus at time t
Table 1: Mathematical notation, in order of appearance.
V = {1, . . . , n} is the set of users and S is a service provider. In each round
t ≤ T each user produces a resource rti with value vti . Users perform an action
ati ∈ A = {C,D}: C corresponds to contributing the resource and D to opt out from
contribution. The set of contributors at time t is denoted as At+ = {i ∈ V : ati = C}.
Contribution is costly, thus contributors pay a cost cti that depends on the char-
acteristics of resource and communication medium. Contribution might also entail a
privacy cost pti, which models the risks of revealing private information to third parties.
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The service provider determines the service quality qt = f(At+) =
∑
i∈At+ v
t
i based
on all contributions received. A quality requirement τ t, either global or per user,
is generated at every timestep. Not all users are required to contribute in order to
satisfy the requirement τ t ≤ ∑i vti . A round is successful, i.e. the service can be
provided, if the quality is higher than the threshold: the success function is defined
as S(qt, τ t) = {Gt if qt ≥ τ t else Bt}. Each user gets the same positive payoff
Gt = G(τ t, qt) from accessing the service, including those who did not contribute.
If the quality threshold is not met, the service cannot be provided and every agent
receives a large negative payoff B(τ t, qt) > 0. Given that payoffs are distributed
equally, there is no incentive for users to contribute unilaterally: the public goods
theory predicts the existence of an equilibrium where nobody contributes.
The individual goal of the users is to maximize their individual utility over T
rounds (see Table 2a): U ti = G(τ
t, qt)1qt≥τt − B(τ t, qt)1qt<τt − cti1ati , where 1X is
the indicator function (equals 1 if event X is true). The social goal, i.e. the goal
of the service provider, is to maximize the total quality of the service over T rounds
Q = max
∑T
t=1 f
t(At+).
The model relies on the following assumptions:
• Users contribute their resources to a central entity, which uses them to provide
a service.
• Contributions cannot be doctored, e.g., to reduce the cost.
• Users are not allowed to communicate with each other; this is generally the case
for simple devices such as smart meters [13].
• The system implements a privacy-preserving resource-management algorithm
that optimizes the use of the resource.
2.1 Applicability to real-world scenarios
This section describes how the scenarios of smart and participatory sensing can be
modelled using the proposed design principle.
2.1.1 Smart grid
Electric vehicles (EVs), associated to households connected to the smart grid, are
required to be periodically recharged. The public good consists of the total energy
surplus σt = pit − βt, which is available to all households for charging the EVs, its
value is computed from the current production of renewable energy pit =
∑
i pi
t
i , and
the current network load βt =
∑
i β
t
i , obtained from EirGrid data [14]. Contribution
to the public good is then defined as opting out from consumption, i.e. renouncing
to charge the EV of a charge vti that might depend on contextual variables such as
the current charge level, the availability of a charging station, and the current energy
surplus. Contribution entails a comfort cost that is assumed to be proportional to
the corresponding value, as the utility of an EV depends on it being charged. Values
are determined in the experiments by sampling a uniform probability distribution, and
costs are determined by sampling a normal distribution, centered around the respective
value.
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qt−i q
t
−i + v
t
i < τ
t τ t − vti ≤ qt−i < τ t τ t ≤ qt−i
outcome failure depends on ai success
U ti (ai = C) −B(τ t, qt)− cti G(τ t, qt)− cti G(τ t, qt)− cti
U ti (ai = D) −B(τ t, qt) −B(τ t, qt) G(τ t, qt)
(a) Definition of utilities for agent i. Let qt−i =
∑
j∈At+\{i} v
t
j = q
t − vti be the total
contributions, excluding agent i, and τ t be the global requirement. This game qualifies
as a threshold public goods game if G(τ t, qt) +B(τ t, qt) > cti, which is always verified
for large enough values of G or B.
Measure Definition
a) Success Σt = min(1, qt/τ t)
b) Efficiency Et = τ t/qt if τ t ≤ qt else 0
c) Social welfare W t = iT
∑T
t=1 U
t
i
d) Privacy P t = 1− |At+|/n
e) Fairness F t = 1n
(
n+ 1− 2
(∑n
i=1(n+1−i)yi∑n
i=1 yi
))
where yi = v
t
i
f) Fairness, over time G = 1n
(
n+ 1− 2
(∑n
i=1(n+1−i)yi∑n
i=1 yi
))
where yi =
∑T
t=1 v
t
i
(b) Measures used during evaluation.
Table 2: Analytical definition of criteria of performance.
2.1.2 Participatory sensing
Traffic congestion is computed by aggregating speeds and locations reported by cars
using a participatory sensing approach [15]. The value vti of individual measurements
reflects the novelty of the information, which might depend on the actions of other
users [16], e.g., duplicated information due to local correlation in measurements. In
the specific case, measurements cannot be linked with one another as the dataset lacks
GPS coordinates [17], therefore the value of novelty is approximated with the change
of speed, as a sudden change in speed is considered more informative than keeping a
constant speed. Contributing data comes at a transmission cost cti – that might depend
on the characteristics of the message, e.g., size, and of the medium, e.g., congestion,
power consumption – and a privacy cost pti – that might depend on disclosing private
information, such as location and speed [18]. Costs are determined as the distance to
the only points of interests known in the data: the origin and destination of a trip. The
public good is created if the sum of individual contributions is higher than a certain
threshold τ , which is set to 80% of the size of the population, which means that the
service is successfully generated if at least 80% of the users contribute a value of 1.
2.2 Measures
The performance of different contribution strategies are quantified with the following
measures (see Table 2b):
a) Success rate: The fraction of the threshold that has been covered by contribu-
tions, or 1 if the total contribution is higher than the threshold.
b) Efficiency: The ratio between the requirement and the sum of contributions.
Efficiency is 1 if the sum of contributions is equivalent to the threshold e.g., all
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agents contribute 1, it is lower than 1 if the sum of contributions is larger than
the threshold.
c) Social welfare: The average reward, sum of a constant benefit and a constant
negative cost (only for contributors).
d) Privacy: the fraction of agents that did not disclose private information during
the current timestep.
e) Fairness: The Gini coefficient represents the fairness of the current round of
contributions (0 is total equality). It is computed for each timestep, as the Gini
coefficient of the values that agents contributed in that timestep, and aggregated
across time and repetitions.
f) Fairness over time: It represents the fairness of the history of contributions. It
measures the Gini coefficient computed across agents on the individual histories
of contribution, from the start of the simulation to the current timestep.
The definition of privacy can be made scenario-specific by adopting an appropriate
privacy measure, e.g., K-anonymity, differential privacy [19].
2.3 Algorithms
This section describes the contribution strategy algorithms chosen for the analysis in
our framework. The choice favored well-established and general-purpose algorithms
as opposed to algorithms with state-of-the-art efficiency, as the goal is to highlight
trade-offs between measures over different scenarios. The review and comparison of
scenario-specific algorithms is not aligned to the goals of this paper and is therefore
out of scope.
2.3.1 Centralized algorithms
Centralized or top-down algorithms rely on a central optimizer that satisfies the public
good while minimizing the cost of contribution. This problem can be modeled as the
well-know Knapsack problem:
{
minimize
∑n
i=1 c
t
i ∗ ati
subject to
∑n
i=1 v
t
i ∗ ati > τ t
, where the weight of
items is given by the contribution value and the value of each item is defined as the
inverse of the cost. We chose a customized “fully polynomial time approximation
scheme” (FPTAS) that reaches the knapsack constraints from above, instead of from
below, such that the threshold can be met.
2.3.2 Localized algorithms
Decentralized algorithms distribute decision making at the local level and allow com-
munication between agents for coordination [20] or learning [21]. In this paper we
focus on localized algorithms, a type of decentralized algorithms that operate only on
local knowledge, without assuming the availability of special hardware for communi-
cation [13]. Aspiration learning is a learning algorithm that is specifically tailored for
coordination games [22]; agents contribute based on their “satisfaction value”, which
depends on their previous experiences, but does not consider the current context, e.g.,
current value or cost. Q-Learning is a model-free unsupervised reinforcement learning
approach that considers both the history and the current context in the decision [23].
A disadvantage of reinforcement learning is its sensitivity to initial conditions, for
example a multi-agent learning process might converge to an inefficient equilibrium
6
where nobody contributes. In order to make this outcome less likely, agents are pre-
trained to prefer contribution in order to bias the initial exploration period. Pre-
training is a reasonable solution as it can be performed during device manufacturing
and its effect on the behavior of agents fades off quickly as agents start learning.
3 Results and Analysis
This section presents the results of computational experiments. Trade-offs are evalu-
ated between the three contribution strategies presented in section 2.3 and two base-
lines: a baseline in which users contribute “fully”, i.e. always, and a “random” baseline
in which users have 50% probability of contributing at each round 1.
All experiments are performed in a simulation framework developed in Python
and run on ETHs cluster Euler. Results presented in this paper represent the average
state of 20 simulations after 5000 timesteps, and error bars represent the confidence
intervals at 95%.
The contribution strategies are tested with real-world datasets in two smart city
applications, using cost, value and public good values as described in Section 2.1.
The traffic dataset contains mobility traces of private cars obtained from U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy National Renewable Energy Laboratory[17]. The electric vehicle (EV)
dataset contains residential consumption data obtained from Irish Smart Meter trial
and renewable energy production data from Irish elecriticy grid operator EirGrid [14].
Full results are shown in Figure 1 and present the comparisons of the contribution
strategies by the six measures discussed in Section 2.2. Most measures do not show
a dependency on the size of the population, i.e., the number of sensors, because the
value of the public good threshold is chosen to be proportional to the size of the
population. If the threshold would be constant, an increase in the number of sensors,
i.e., potential contributors, would make the creation of the public good easier, hence
affect all measures.
In terms of success rate (Figure 1a), full contribution and centralized optimization
always succeed,i.e., are always able to provide the services, while Q-Learning does not
guarantee success and fails in about 2-3% of the cases. In terms of efficiency (Figure
1b), centralized optimization is the most efficient solution, as it finds the subset of users
whose contribution satisfies the requirement 2 at the lowest cost 3. Efficiency measures
how close the total contribution approaches the needs of the system, hence baseline in
which all agents contribute will have the lowest possible efficiency. Efficiency increases
with the size of the population as a higher number of possible solutions – combinations
of individual contributions – makes it more likely to find an efficient solution.
Similarly, in terms of social welfare (see Figure 1c), optimization scores the highest,
while localized strategies reach a welfare around 30% lower. Social welfare is the
difference between the rewards from the public good and the costs of contributions,
so a negative value indicates that costs are higher than gains. Differently from the
previous result, the performance of aspiration learning is equivalent to that of Q-
Learning, as opposed to that of optimization.
150% chance of contribution does not imply that 50% chance of success, because each
contribution has an average value greater than 1.
2Optimization is not successful if the total requirement is larger than the sum of contribu-
tions from all agents, but the experiments are generated to be successful if all users contribute.
3The approximation algorithm used to solve the optimization problem does not guarantee
to find the global minimum.
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In terms of privacy (Figure 1d), centralized optimization achieves no privacy, like
full contribution, as it requires knowledge about the state of all users. Random con-
tribution offers the highest privacy – around 50% of users – at the expenses of other
measures, e.g., success rate and efficiency. Localized contribution strategies allow a
fraction of the user to keep their data private. This fraction increases with the pop-
ulation size for aspiration learning, while Q-Learning trades a lower privacy off for a
higher fairness.
Fairness is measured in two ways: “fairness of contributions” compares the actions
of all agents at the current time t (see Figure 1e), while “fairness of contribution
over time” considers the histories of contribution up to time t (see Figure 1f). Full
contribution requires all users to contribute, thus it trades perfect fairness off for other
measures such as efficiency. Optimization offers low fairness because it considers only
the current state, and users in certain states, e.g., with high values, are more likely
to contribute than others. Conversely, optimization offers high fairness over time
because agents are randomly assigned to states, hence the chance of being in any state
is over time the same. This result might not hold if states are not randomly assigned,
e.g., some users are more likely to obtain high values/costs than others. Aspiration
learning bases decisions only on the history of decisions, this leads to higher fairness,
as contributions are independent of the state, and to lower fairness over time, caused
by individual differences in training that accumulate over time. These values decrease
with the population size, while other contribution strategies are not affected by this
parameter. Q-Learning scores high values in both measures as it considers both the
current context and the history of actions, this allows agents to learn similar behaviors
by interacting with one another.
Type Algorithm Pros Cons
Baseline Full Success Efficiency
Baseline Random Privacy Success
Centralized Knapsack Success, Efficiency Privacy, Fairness
Localized Aspiration Privacy F. over time
Localized Q-Learning Fairness (over time) Efficiency
Table 3: Comparison of contribution strategies.
Summary of trade-offs is presented in Table 3. Centralized optimization assures
the success of the service and high efficiency, it is hence appropriate for mission critical
services for which computation and network constraints are not an issue, e.g., measur-
ing current load on the smart grid to prevent outages. Localized strategies are instead
best suited for applications where privacy concerns might reduce user adoption, e.g.,
participatory sensing. Finally, Q-Learning offers the highest fairness, hence it is ideal
for applications where fair access to the service is desirable, e.g., charging of electric
vehicles.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper provides a scenario-independent design principle and simulation framework
for smart city applications that rely on voluntary user contribution. Voluntary contri-
butions empower users to control the ownership of their resource, e.g., by contributing
8
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Figure 1: Comparison of contribution strategies, the x axis represents
the population size. Dashed lines represent baselines, solid lines represent
contribution strategies. The plots show trade-offs between centralized opti-
mization, aspiration learning and Q-Learning in terms of efficiency, privacy and
fairness. Optimization offers the highest success rate and efficiency, while as-
piration learning and Q-Learning offers higher privacy. Q-Learning is the only
contribution strategy to offer high fairness on both measures.
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data towards a service, independently of the type of resource and its use. The applica-
bility of this framework is verified using real-world data from the application scenarios
of traffic congestion monitoring and electric vehicle charging.
Results quantify trade-offs produced by different contribution strategies along mea-
sures such as efficiency, privacy and fairness. The trade-offs identified hold in both
scenarios, suggesting that they depend on characteristics of the algorithms and not
on characteristics of the scenarios. Therefore the results can be used as implementa-
tion recommendations to service providers and system designers about the choice of
contribution strategies.
Modeling and application in other scenarios with different cost and value character-
istics is left to future work, for example “negative” contribution in traffic congestion,
where users contribute to the public good by choosing a longer route instead of the
shortest but congested route [24]. Incentives for contributions are important in scenar-
ios that rely on user participation [25]. However, incentives mechanisms would require
quantifying privacy [26], which could be addressed in future work. Another limitation
of the current work is that only localized algorithms are considered. Relaxing this as-
sumption is a worthy avenue for future work. Communication between agents would
introduce privacy concerns during communication between agents, which would need
to be measured, but would would allow analysis of new classes of algorithms, such as
decentralized optimization.
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